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clearly shows an intention to dedicate, since the policy favoring
grants to the public dispenses with the ordinary rules of conveyance, and the formality of the dedication should suffice to
convey perfect title to the public. 10 7 Since such a dedication is
similar to a grant to the general public, there should be no requirement of acceptance.
Conclusion
With the above analysis in mind, it would seem that the
Banta case is correct, and the Chevron case is sustainable on the
theory that it amounted to a formal, non-statutory dedication.
Banta did realize the existence of this third type of dedication in
the jurisprudence, but even the older authority cited by the
court had been somewhat diluted by the common law. There is
no objection to relying on common law precedents when dealing with a statutory or implied dedication since neither type
reaches results materially opposed to principles of the civil law.
But by a return to the principles of Louisiana civil law and a
recognition that a complete adoption of the common law is not
necessary in the limited third area of formal, non-statutory dedications, the Louisiana courts in the future could begin a consistent line of jurisprudence decided on principles which represent the best of both worlds.
Michael G. Page
THE FICTITIOUS COMMUNITY AND THE
RIGHT TO PARTITION
Introduction
The Louisiana Civil Code provides that a community of
acquets and gains arises from every marriage contracted in this
state, unless the parties agree before marriage to a contrary
stipulation.1 The community is terminated when the bonds of
matrimony are dissolved2 or when there is a separation of property 3 or a separation from bed and board.4 Upon the dissolution
107. See Eggerson v. Livaudais, 6 Orl. App. 417 (La. 1909); City of
Baton Rouge v. Bird, 21 La. Ann. 244 (1869); Saulet v. City of New Orleans,
10 La. Ann. 81 (1855); DeArmas v. Mayor and City of New Orleans, 5 La.
132 (1833) (dissenting opinion).
1. LA. Cxv. CODE arts. 2392, 2399, 2424.
2. Id. arts. 136, 2405.
3. See id. arts. 2425, 2430.
4. Id. art. 155.
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of the community by any of these means, the husband and wife
or their heirs are entitled each to one half the assets of the
former community 5 and are obligated personally, as between
husband and wife, to pay one half the community debts.0 Until
1882 the wife or her heirs could renounce the community assets
and liabilities or accept them absolutely, but could not accept
them with benefit of inventory.7 As a result of legislation enacted in 1882,8 the wife or her heirs is allowed to accept the
community with benefit of inventory. The consequences of such
an acceptance are twofold: First, the husband or his administrator is empowered to administer the wife's half-interest in
community assets to pay community debts, and second, the wife
limits her liability for community debts to her half-interest in
community assets.0
Prominent in Louisiana jurisprudence, both before and after
1882, is the concept that the husband or his administrator may
administer the wife's half-interest to pay community debts, without regard to whether the wife has accepted with benefit of inventory. The courts hold that the community is continued fictitiously to pay community debts, that the wife or her heirs cannot sue for a partition of the assets until after the debts are
paid, and that creditors of community obligations have a preference or privilege on the proceeds of the sale of community
assets.' 0 This practice, which will be tested in light of the legislation, raises two important questions: First, does the husband
5. Id. art. 2406: "The effects which compose the partnership or community of gains are divided into two equal portions between the husband
and the wife, or between their heirs at the dissolution of the marriage ..
"
6. Id. art. 2409: "It is understood that, in the partition of the effects
of the partnership or community of gains, both husband and wife are to
be equally liable for their share of the debts contracted during the marriage and not acquitted at the time of its dissolution."
7. Id. arts. 2406, 2409, 2410. See Mongent v. Pate, 3 La. Ann. 269 (1848).
It should also be noted that Phillips v. Phillips, 160 La. 813, 107 So. 584
(1926), held that LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950) abrogated LA. Civ. CODE art. 2420, now
repealed, which had raised a presumption of renunciation of the community
if not accepted by the wife 30 days after it was dissolved.
8. LA. R.S. 9:2821 (1950): "At the dissolution for any cause of the
marital community, the wife may accept the community of acquets and
gains under the benefit of inventory, in the same manner and with the
same benefits and advantages as are allowed heirs to accept a succession
under the benefit of inventory." See generally LA. CIV. CODE arts. 1032-1068,
which govern the acceptance of a succession with benefit of inventory.
9. See Rhodes v. Rhodes, 190 La. 370, 182 So. 541 (1938).
10. See Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411 (1890), in which the
term the "fictitious existence of the community" was first coined. See also
Guillory v. Latour, 138 La. 142, 70 So. 66 (1915); Rusk v. Warren, 25 La.
Ann. 314 (1873); Lawson v. Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841).
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or his administrator have the power to administer the wife's
half-interest in the dissolved community even though she or
they have not accepted with benefit of inventory; and second,
if so, is the wife or are her heirs nevertheless entitled to an
immediate partition of right if they accept the community unconditionally, or can they be forced to submit to a settlement
of the former community before they are allowed a partition?
Primary attention will be given to dissolution of the community
by death of one of the spouses, since this mode of terminating
the regime has raised ancillary questions concerning the relation
of the former community to the administration of the deceased's
succession. However, the same reasons are advanced by the
jurisprudence to justify the fictitious existence of the community after its dissolution when it is dissolved by means other
than death.1
The Legislation to 1960
The history of the community of acquets and gains is
replete with reference to the "continuation" of the community.
The early French writers recognized that as a general rule,
the community was dissolved by death of one of the spouses.
But if no partition took place between the survivor and the
decedent's heirs, the community might be "continued" according to local custom. 1 2 The French writers were divided over
whether this was a new community or a continuation of the
former marital community by operation of law. Regardless of
the concept adopted, it included, besides the possessions which
had been part of the community during marriage, acquisitions
by the surviving spouse after dissolution made with community assets or their revenues. Acquisitions made by the children were not included, because they did not arise from exchanges for or income from community assets, which were all
possessed by the surviving spouse. However, the surviving spouse
had the same powers as those the husband enjoyed during mar11. See Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So.2d 382 (1948).
12. J.

BRISSAUD,

A

HISTORY

OF FRENCH

PRIVATE

LAW

§

405

(1912).

The

ancient French law had developed the rule that communities (not marital
communities, but a kind of holding in indivision) might be formed between
or among any persons by the fact of common life together for a year
and a day. Such a community could be dissolved merely by the decision
to live separately. This concept of general application was used to develop
the theory that the marital community could be "continued" if the survivor
and the children continued to live together after dissolution.
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riage. This "continued" community ended upon the death of
the surviving spouse, upon a second marriage, or, according
to certain customs, upon a partition carried out at the children's
demand when they came of age.' A similar concept obtained
in the Spanish law, which provided that a new sociedad, an
ordinary partnership, might be formed tacitly between the
survivor and heirs if they continued to hold their property in
common, 14 and as with the French, acquisitions by the children
did not enter into it. The Spanish referred to this partnership
as an ordinary sociedad, as distinguished from the marital community, which was termed sociedad de gananciales.15
The Louisiana supreme court in the early 1800's held that
no such custom of a "continued community" developed in
Louisiana." The only direct legislative authority for a continued
community is in the instance of an absent spouse. The absentee's
husband or wife may prevent the putting of the absentee's
heirs into provisional possession of the absentee's patrimony,
his separate assets and liabilities and half of the community,
and elect to continue the marital community. 7 Notice should
also be directed to Civil Code article 1292,18 which, in providing
for a tacit community of property when co-heirs continue to
own inherited assets in indivision, might afford a basis for the
same kind of partnership spoken of in both the ancient Spanish
and French laws concerning the surviving spouse and the
deceased's heirs. However, the concept of the fictitiously continued community, as it developed in the Louisiana decisions,
is different from these. It is that the community has but a
fictitious existence and only for the purpose of paying community debts. The inquiry thus narrows to whether the hus13. Id. at § 564.
14. G. SCHMIDT, CivuL LAW OF SPAIN AND Maxico art. 58 (1851).
Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in

See also

1803: Sociedad de Gananciales,

30 LA. L. Rev. 1, 31 (1969).
15. Pugh, The Spanish Community of G-ains i n 1808: Sociedad de
Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REv. 1, 31 (1969).
16. Dickson v. Dickson, 36 La. Ann. 453 (1884); Broussard v. Bernard, 7
La. 216 (1834); Pizerot v. Meuillon's Heirs, 3 Mart. (O.S.) 97 (La. 1813).
17. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 64, 65.
18. Id. art. 1292 provides: "When a person, at his decease, leaves several

heirs, each of them becomes an undivided proprietor of the effects of the
succession, for the part or portion coming to him, which forms among the

heirs a community of property, as long as it remains undivided." Article
1290 indicates that this article could be applied to the ownership in indivision
following the dissolution of the marital community. But this community
after dissolution would only continue until one of the co-owners demanded
a partition.
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band, or his heirs, administrator, or executor have any power
to administer the wife's half-interest to pay community debts,
when the wife or her heirs have not accepted with benefit of
inventory, either until she or her heirs demand a partition,
or even against their demand for an immediate partition.
The publication of the de la Vergne copy of the 1808 Digest
with Moreau-Lislet's source notes on the interleaves affirms
that our matrimonial regime law is Spanish in origin.' 9 Both
article 6820 and article 7121 of the 1808 Digest, Book III, Title 5,
which provided for division of the community assets and liabilities upon dissolution of the regime, were taken primarily from
the Spanish writer, Febrero. 2 The Spanish law was well settled
that after dissolution the husband would continue to be liable
personally to the community creditors for the full amount of
the community debts, since he had incurred them.2 3 The wife,
on the other hand, became liable personally both to the husband
and to the community creditors for one half the community
24
debts only if she accepted half the community assets.
19. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1803: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1 (1969).
20. See REPRINT OF THE 'DE LA VERGNE VOLUME: THE DIGEST OF THE CIVIL
LAWS, TERRITORY OF ORLEANS

IN 1808, WITH MOREAU-IASLET'S SOURCE NOTES, art.

68 tit. 5, bk. III, pp. 336-37 (1968). The following sources are listed for art.
68, tit. 5, bk. III (now LA. Civ. CODE art. 2406, which provides for the division
of the assets of the community): FUERO REAL 3.3.3; FEBRERO, LBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS (1739): CONTRATOS TRATADO DR 1.1.22. 236-244; FEBRERO LBRERIA DE
ESCRIBANOS: JUICIoS, TRATADO DE (1789) 4.1.1.4.1.1, 2, 3, 5, 11, 12; FEBRERO LBRERIA
DR ESCRI3ANOS: JuIciS, TRATADO DR (1789) 4.1.1.5.5. 38-39.
21. See REPRINT OF THE DE LA VERONE VOLUME: THE DIGEST OF THE CIVIL
LAWS, TERRITORY OF ORLEANS IN 1808, WITH MOREAU-LISLET'S SOURCE NOTES, art.
71, tit. 5, bk. III, pp. 338-39 (1968). The following sources are listed for art.
71, tit. 5, bk. III (now LA. CIv. CODE art. 2409, which provides for the division
of the debts of the community); FEBRERo LIBRERIA DE EscRIBANOS: JUICIOS,
TRATADO DE (1789) 4.1.1.3.1.1.; FEBRERo LIBRERIA DE EsCRrSANOS: JuIciS, TRATADO
Du (1789) 4.1.1.4.2.69.
22. See notes 20, 21 supra.
23. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 41 n.273 (1969). See also 3 PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE
no. 1068 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959) in which It is pointed out that since
the husband contracted the debts personally, he can be proceeded against
for the whole of the debts, although the wife will ultimately have to reimburse him for one half, if he is actually forced to pay the whole amount.
See also J. ERISSAUD, A HISTORY OF FRENCH PRIVATE LAW § 571 (1912).
24. Matienzo, Comm. to N.R. 10.4.9, Gloss. I, no. 8; Azevedo, Comm. to
N.R. 10.4.9., nos. 15 and 18; FEBRERO LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS: JUICIOS, TRATADO
DE (1789), 1.1.3.2.60. See also G. MCKAY, A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY § 1464 (1925).
These authorities make it clear that as between husband and wife, each
will ultimately bear one-half of the community debts, so that if the husband
is forced to satisfy all the debts, he can get reimbursement for one-half of
them from the wife.
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Febrero notes the silence of ancient Spanish laws and
writers as to the manner of settling the community after
dissolution. 25 He suggests that the distribution of assets and
payment of debts probably was handled informally by the
heirs and surviving spouse without the aid of a judicially
appointed administrator, except in the case of an insolvent or
vacant succession. 26 In that instance, the community assets and
liabilities had to be determined before the deceased's succession was administered, for these or a part of them, depending on whether or not the wife accepted the community, might
27
form a part of his succession and would be administered in it.
It appears that the Spanish commentators did not contemplate
an administration of the community as a unit after dissolution.
Febrero did not suggest that anyone had the right to liquidate
the community as such,28 and he did not even list a surviving
spouse or community representative as one of the persons
required to take inventories. 29 Under Spanish law it was clear
that a partition could have been demanded before the com80
munity debts were paid.
Although the ancient Spanish writers spoke of the payment
of community debts, they were speaking in terms of accounting procedures, as illustrated by the notarial writings of
Febrero,31 rather than of liquidation measures. There was
nothing in the Spanish legislation to indicate that the community formed a separate mass for liquidation or that community creditors enjoyed any preference over the spouses'
1.1.3.3.77.
JUIcIOs, TRATADO DE (1789)
The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808: Sociedad de GananL. REV. 1, 33 (1969).
33.
32.

25. FEBRERo LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS:

26. Pugh,
ciales, 30 LA.
27. Id. at
28. Id. at

29. FEBRFRO LIBRERIA DE ESCRIBANOS:

JUICIOS, TRATADO DR (1789)

1.1.1.2.42.

30. Gutierrez, Quaestio CXXIII, no. 1; Matienzo, Comm. to N.R. 10.4.5.,
Gloss XX, nos. 2 and 3; Azevedos, Comm. to N.R. 10.4.6, no. 4; and Comm. to
N.R. 10.4.8, no. 4.

See also G. SCHMIDT, CIVIL LAW OF SPAIN AND MEXICO art.

61 (1851), which reads as follows: "When the community is dissolved for any
of the foregoing causes, either party has the right to proceed to the immediate settlement of the same by paying his share of such debts. But the community affairs may be settled and the community wound up and its property
distributed in the succession of the deceased husband." Pugh, The Spanish
Community of Gains in 1808: Sociedad de Gananciales,30 LA. L. REV. 1, 32,
33 (1969).
31. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REV. 1, 39, 40, especially 40 nn. 268, 269 (1969). See also 3
PLANIOL, CIVIL LAW TREATISE nos. 1238-1, 1238-2 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. (1959),
which indicate that the "settlement" of the community was also in the
nature of an accounting procedure on paper, with credit and debit columns.
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separate creditors. 32 After dissolution, the community creditors
were limited to seeking satisfaction from the respective spouses
or their heirs to the extent of their respective personal liabilities
From the husband or his heirs total satisfaction could be
demanded; from the wife or her heirs nothing could be demanded if she or they renounced the community, and only one
half the debts if they accepted the community, unless she or
they had obligated herself or themselves personally for more.
In any of these situations the community creditors could demand
satisfaction out of the total patrimony of the obligated spouse
or his heirs-i.e., out of his or their separate assets as well as
out of those assets belonging to him or them which formerly
formed part of the commnuity. If the debtor spouse or his
heirs were insolvent, the community creditors were obligated
to compete with the separate creditors for payment out of his
total assets; community creditors did not enjoy a preference
83
over the separate creditors.
Because Louisiana matrimonial regime law is rooted in these
ancient Spanish concepts of the community, it is understandable that there are no articles in the Louisiana Civil Code concerning liquidation of the community as an entity or the rights
of third parties against community assets as a separate patrimonial mass. Under the old Spanish law the community of
acquets and gains was a contractual agreement between husband and wife, and third parties had rights and obligations
as to the husband and wife only as individuals, not as to the
community as an entity. Such is the law in both respects under
the Civil Code today, 4 where the community regime is not
ever subjected to the ordinary law of partnership. 5 There is
32. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808: Sociedad de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REv. 1, 40 (1969). See also 3 PLANIOL CivIL LAW TREATISE nos.

905, 1352 (La. St. L. Inst. transl. 1959).

No. 905 makes clear that at no time

does the community have a separate legal personality distinct from the
spouses who compose it. At dissolution, the spouses' respective shares in
the community will be commingled with their separate property, and the
creditors of the former community will compete with the separate creditors

of the spouses. No. 1352 points out that community creditors cannot claim
any priority on the common estate against the separate creditors of the
spouses.

33. Pugh, The Spanish Community of Gains in 1808: Socieded de Gananciales, 30 LA. L. REv. 1, 41, 42 (1969).
34. See LA. CIV. CODE arts. 2325, 2402, 2403, 2404, 2406, 2408, 2409, all of
which are found in bk. III (entitled Of the Different Modes of Acquiring

the Ownership of Things), tit. VI (Of the Marriage Contract, and of the
Respective Rights of the Parties in Relation to Their Property).
35. Id. art. 2807.
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no legislative basis in Louisiana for either the fictitious continuation of the community to pay the community debts or for
a preference or privilege for community creditors. The lawful
causes of preference are privilege and mortgage, 86 and privilege
can be claimed only in those instances expressly mentioned in
the Code.8 7 Nowhere in the Code is there a privilege in favor
of creditors of community obligations. The community creditors
may proceed either against the husband or his administrator
for the whole of the debts,38 or against the wife, if she accepts
the community, for half the community debts.89 In each case
the liability of the spouses is personal and the rights of community creditors are those of ordinary creditors only.
Although there is no legislative basis for continuing the
community by operation of law to pay the community debts,
there are some instances when the husband or his administrator
may administer the wife's half-interest on other bases. As
discussed previously, the wife may consent to this administration by accepting with benefit of inventory. The wife or her
heirs may also designate the husband or his administrator as
their mandatary.40 If no mandate is conferred and the husband
or his administrator uses community assets to pay community
debts without objection from the wife or her heirs, the husband or his administrator should be held to have acted as a
negotiorum gestor.41 The gestor is bound to act as a prudent
36. Id. art. 3184.
37. Id. art. 3185.
38. Id. art. 2409. As has been pointed out, the husband is liable to third
persons for all of the community debts because he personally incurred them.
His liability to third persons is not automatically reduced to one-half if the
wife or her heirs accept the community because this could only be accomplished by the express consent of the creditor to the substitution and by the
express release of the husband for one-half of the community debts. See
in this regard id. art. 2192. See also id. art. 3182, which states that the debtor
must pay his debts out of all of his property, movable and immovable, present and future. This justifies making even the husband's separate property
liable for a community debt.
39. Id. art. 2409.
40. Id. art. 2985. A mandate conceived in general terms confers only a
power of administration (art. 2996), and to alienate, buy, mortgage, or to do
anything other than acts of mere administration, the power to do so under
a general mandate must be express (arts. 2996, 2997). But article 3000 provides that powers granted to persons who fulfill certain functions or do
business in the ordinary course of affairs to which they are devoted need
not be specified, but are inferred from the functions which the mandatary
exercises. Since the husband had administered the community as its head
while it existed, this article might permit him or his administrator to liquidate the former community under merely a general mandate, without an
express specification of powers.
41. Id. arts. 2295-2300.
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administrator for the affairs of the owner, 42 and if the gestor
fulfills this standard of care, the owner is obligated for the
gestor's acts whether or not the owner knew of the management. 43 But the wife or her heirs may at any time put an end
to the gestor's management and assume it for themselves, for
the gestor may not impose his services on the owner against
44
the owner's will.
The wife or her heirs have a right to an immediate partition,45 and they are entitled to a partition in kind, if at all
possible.4 6 This comports with Code articles 2406 and 2409,
which provide that the wife is entitled to one half of the specific
assets in the community and is obligated to pay one half of
the community debts. Indicative that an immediate partition
of the former community was contemplated is article 1135,
repealed in 1960, under which the curator of a vacant succession or of absent heirs was bound, immediately after his appointment, to sue for a partition to ascertain the part of the community or the partnership belonging to the deceased and which
47
would form part of his succession for administrative purposes.
Article 1337 indicates that during partition, if the co-owners'
creditors so demand, some provision may have to be made to
pay debts. 48 The wife or her heirs may offer to pay her or their
42. Id. arts. 2298.
43. Id. arts. 2295, 2299. The equity referred to in article 2299 is defined
in article 1965 as general Christian and moral principles. But particularly
appropriate to the negotiorum gestio situation Is the principle that no one
should enrich himself at the expense of another.
44. The gestor is only to act for the owner until the owner can attend
to the business himself (see id.art. 2295), and if the owner forbids the gestor
to manage his affairs, then the gestor is without authority to do so. Equity
would not obligate the owner to comply with obligations forced on him over
his objection (see id. arts. 1965, 2299).
45. 1d. arts. 1289, 1308.
46. Id. art. 1290 provides that the rules in the chapter on partition (arts.
1289-1414), with the exception of those relating to collation, apply to coproprietors of the same thing. See in this regard Demoruelle v. Allen, 218 La.
603, 50 So.2d 208 (1950). Article 1337 suggests that the wife or her heirs have
the right to demand a partition in kind; and LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4606 states
that a partition in kind is to be allowed, if possible. Although article 1337
refers to a public auction, LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 4614 makes clear that the sale
may be either public or private.
47. The decisions are divided on whether or not this article was to be
applied to the community of acquets and gains. For the negative position,
see Succession of Geddes, 36 La. Ann. 963 (1884), and Succession of Dumestre,
42 La. Ann. 411 (1890). For a contrary holding, see Festivan v. Clement,
135 La. 938, 66 So. 304 (1914).
48. LA. Civ. CODE art. 1337: "Each of the coheirs may demand in kind his
share of the movables and immovables of the succession; but if there are
creditors who have made any seizure or opposition, or if a majority of the
coheirs are of opinion that the sale is necessary in order to satisfy the debts
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share of the community obligations with their separate property,
if they have any. However, even if the wife or her heirs have
no separate property, but only the half-interest in the former
community, it is submitted that a partition should be allowed
if demanded. Neither the courts nor the community creditors
should be allowed to second-guess how the wife or her heirs
will handle their share of the debts; all that the legislation
requires is that they assume personal liability for one half the
community debts. If the community creditors feel insecure under
this procedure, they may prevent the partition in kind by
seizing the undivided interests of both husband and wife or
their heirs, and if they are judgment creditors, by executing
upon them.49 At the resulting sale, the wife or her heirs, if
they are able, will be permitted to purchase the specific assets
they desire.
The Jurisprudence
A survey of the Louisiana decisions concerning whether or
not the community must be liquidated before a partition can
be effected reveals seemingly hopeless contradiction. At first
there appear to be two distinct lines of cases-one holding that
the husband or his administrator may administer the dissolved
community as a whole to pay the common debts, at least as
long as the wife does not object, and perhaps even against
her objection; 51 and the other holding that once the community
and charges of the succession, the movables shall be sold at public auction,
after the usual advertisements." see note 46 supra, which explains how this
article might be applied to the dissolved community by virtue of article 1290.
49. Id. art. 1337 indicates that the undivided interests may be seized.
Although no distinction is drawn in the article, the writer suggests that the
article envisions only succession creditors as seizing creditors, in the case
of co-heirs, and not the case of a separate creditor of one of the co-heirs
seizing his debtor's undivided interest. Likewise, if the dissolved community
were involved it is submitted that the article would allow only community
creditors to prevent a partition in kind by seizing the totality of the undivided interests and by executing upon it. Where only the undivided interest
of one of the spouses is under seizure, the other spouse or his heirs is still
entitled to a partition. Bee Giglio v. Giglio, 159 La. 46, 105 So. 95 (1925).
It should also be noted that although LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3501 allows property
to be seized without a judgment by a writ of sequestration, articles 2291 and
3510 stipulate that there can be no execution on property without a final
judgment.
50. LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1290, 1343; LA. CODE CIv. P. art. 4614. But see Fertel
v. Fertel, 226 La. 307, 76 So.2d 377 (1955) and Prescott v. Gordon, 22 La. Ann.
250 (1870), which do not construe art. 1343 in this manner.
51. Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So.2d 382 (1948); Succession of
Ratcliff, 212 La. 563, 33 So.2d 114 (1947); Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139
So. 901 (1932); Bossier v. Herwig, 112 La. 539, 36 So. 557 (1904); Thompson
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is dissolved, neither the husband nor his administrator has any
authority to administer it intact as the husband had done during
its existence.5 2 The writer suggests that the two lines of cases
are reconcilable inter sese, but that this reconciliation, to the
extent that it would affirm the right of the husband or his
administrator to settle the community as a whole to pay debts
over the wife's demand for a partition, is inconsistent with the
legislation.
Broussard v. Bernard,55 decided in 1834, held that upon dissolution, the interest of the wife or her heirs attached immediately; and the surviving husband or his administrator had no
right to administer the community as the husband had during
the marriage, and could not alienate the wife's interest in such
assets.5 4 Lawson v. Ripley,5" decided in 1841, held that neither
v. Vance, 110 La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903); Messick v. Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161,
27 So. 815 (1900); Zeigler v. His Creditors, 49 La. Ann. 144 (1896); Verrier v.
Lorio, 48 La. Ann. 717, 19 So. 677 (1896); Landreaux v. Louque, 43 La. Ann.
234 (1891); Webre v. Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 7 So. 460 (1890); Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411 (1890); Bartoli v. Huguenard, 39 La. Ann. 411 (1887);
Oriol v. Herndon, 38 La. Ann. 759 (1886); Succession of Bright, 38 La. Ann. 141
(1886); Killelea v. Barrett, 37 La. Ann. 865 (1885); Ealer v. Lodge, 36 La.
Ann. 115 (1884); Succession of Boyer, 36 La. Ann. 506 (1884); Durham v.
Williams, 32 La. Ann. 162 (1880); Cestac v. Florane, 31 La. Ann. 493 (1879);
Burton v. Grugier, 30 La. Ann. 478 (1878); Riley v. Condran, 26 La. Ann. 294
(1874); Ricker v. Pearson, 26 La. Ann. 391 (1874); Rusk v. Warren, 25 La.
Ann. 314 (1873); Sadler v. Kimbrough, 24 La. Ann. 534 (1872); Willard v.
Peyton, 24 La. Ann. 342 (1872); Baird v. Lemee, 23 La. Ann. 424 (1871); Chapman v. Woodward, 16 La. Ann. 167 (1861); Bronson v. Balch, 19 La. Ann. 39
(1867); Succession of McLean, 12 La. Ann. 222 (1857); Guice v. Lawrence, 2
La. Ann. 226 (1847); Ogden v. Ogden, 10 Rob. 457 (La. 1845); Hart v. Foley, 1
Rob. 378 (La. 1842); Jeaudron v. Boudreau, 1 Rob. 383 (La. 1842); Lawson v.
Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841).
52. Lewis v. Clay, 221 La. 663, 60 So.2d 78 (1952); Ogden v. Leland University, 48 La. Ann. 190, 21 So. 685 (1896); Heirs of Murphy v. Jurey & Gillis,
39 La. Ann. 785 (1887); Myers v. Grighan, 34 La. Ann. 1026 (1882); Glasscock
v. Clark, 33 La. Ann. 584 (1881); Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848 (1880);
Bennett v. Fuller, 29 La. Ann. 663 (1877); Smith v. Syndics of Dorsey, 5 La.
Ann. 381 (1850); German v. Gay, 9 La. 580 (1836); Broussard v. Bernard, 7
La. 216 (1834).
53. 7 La. 216 (1834).
54. Id. at 222: "That the community of acquets and gains, as such, continues after the death of one of the partners, with all the legal effects resulting from such a relation, with authority in the husband, if he should
survive, to be still regarded as head of the community, with power to bind
the community property by his contracts, and to alienate it without restraint, is a proposition so repugnant to all our notions of a community, and
so subversive of first principles, that it can not be for a moment admitted.
Each party is seized of an undivided one-half of the property composing the
mass, and the surviving party can not validly alienate the share not belonging to him." See also Lewis v. Clay, 221 La. 663, 60 So.2d 78 (1952);
Glasscock v. Clark, 33 La. Ann. 584 (1881); Smith v. Syndics of Dorsey, 5
La. Ann. 381 (1850).
55. 17 La. 238 (1841).
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the survivor nor the heirs of the deceased could claim his or
their share of the assets until the community debts had been
paid.56 Some cases following Lawson even stated that the community debts had to be paid before it could be determined
whether or not there were any assets to be divided.57 The courts
in Lawson and its adherents based their holdings on the rationale
that since the husband incurred the community debts, continued
to be responsible personally for all of them after the community
had terminated,5 s and had to answer for them even out of his
separate assets if the community was insufficient, 59 then, the
settlement of the community was a natural consequence of the
settling and paying of the succession debts.6 When the community was dissolved by death of the wife, the creditors generally proceeded against the husband alone for satisfaction of
all community debts,0 1 for, whereas the husband was liable
personally for community debts, the wife's heirs were only
contingently liable for one half the community debts and even
then could relieve themselves from personal liability by
renouncing her succession or accepting with benefit of inventory.62 The administrator of the wife's succession could not
administer the community property as a whole to pay community debts.68
56. In Lawson, it was said that the wife or her heirs, although their distinct interest to the community attaches at the dissolution of the marriage,
have nothing to claim out of the acquets and gains until the community
debts are paid.
57. Hart v. Foley, 1 Rob. 378 (La. 1842); Cestac v. Florane, 31 La. Ann.
493 (1879).
58. Hawley v. Crescent City Bank, 26 La. Ann. 230, 232 (1874); Rusk v.
Warren, 25 La. Ann. 314 (1873). In Hawley, the following was said: "Upon
dissolution of the community by the death of the wife, the responsibility of
the husband in regard to community debts is not changed. He is absolutely
[H]e has, so far as the final
and personally bound for their payment ....
settlement and liquidation of the community after its dissolution is concerned, the same rights he had during its existence, because he Is, after the
dissolution, under the same responsibility for the community debts that he
was before the dissolution. It is but just that he should have these powers.
The community property continues under his control until the debts are
paid."
59. Succession of McLean, 12 La. Ann. 222 (1857); Hart v. Foley, 1 Rob.
378 (La. 1842).
60. Messick v. Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161, 27 So. 815 (1900); Oriol v. Herndon, 24 La. Ann. 759 (1886); Durham v. Williams, 32 La. Ann. 162 (1880);
Succession of McLean, 12 La. Ann. 222 (1842); Lawson v. Ripley, 17 La. 238
(1841).
61. Baird v. Lemee, 23 La. Ann. 424 (1871); Lawson v. Ripley, 17 La. 238
(1841).
62. Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So.2d 382 (1948).
63. Hewes v. Baxter, 46 La. Ann. 1281, 16 So. 196 (1894); Succession of
Hooke, 46 La. 353, 15 So. 150 (1894), in which it was said that the creditor's
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Both lines of cases recognize that the wife's interest, or
that of her heirs, attaches immediately and unconditionally
upon dissolution of the community. 4 Although there are some
decisions holding that the wife's interest, or that of her heirs,
is only residuary and contingent until the debts are paid, 65 the
only explanation which accords with the legislation is that the
wife's interest is unconditional and that it can be considered
residuary only in the sense that she takes it encumbered with
her share of community debts. She is no less the owner of her
half of the community assets because she takes it subject to
the personal obligation to pay the debts. 6
A study of the Broussard and Lawson dichotomy of cases
points out that while there appears to be a conflict concerning
the authority of the husband or his administrator to liquidate
the community, the courts have actually found none. The decisions which adhered to the Broussard doctrine involved a husband's sale of specific community assets after dissolution of the
regime without reference to the paying of community debts,
but as if in exercise of the kind of authority he had during the
regime's continuance as its head and master. In such circumstances the courts are firm in holding that his authority as head
and master has ended. 7 In Lawson and the decisions which
followed it, the husband's only authority was to pay community
debts, and the decisions did not admit that the husband or his
administrator had any power to deal otherwise with the wife's
half-interest. 8 The court in Landreaux v. Louque"9 pointed out
this distinction where there was an attempt to interpose the
remedy is

to proceed against the surviving husband and the community

property.
64. Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481 (1894); Bennett v.
Fuller, 29 La. Ann. 663 (1877); Hart v. Foley, 1 Rob. 378 (La. 1842); Lawson
v. Ripley, 17 La. 238 (1841); German v. Gay, 9 La. 580 (1836); Broussard v.
Bernard, 7 La. 216 (1834).
65. Cestac v. Florane, 31 La. Ann. 493 (1879); Willard v. Peyton, 24
La. Ann. 342 (1872); Succession of Ogden, 10 Rob. 457 (La. 1845). See especially Berthelot v. Fitch, 45 La. Ann. 389, 12 So. 625 (1893), which said that
the wife had no interest in any specific thing until the debts were paid, and
Bronson v. Balch, 19 La. Ann. 39 (1867), in which the court said that until

liquidation, the community is but a name, a hope.
66. Bossier v. Herwig, 112 La. 539, 36 So. 557 (1904); Dickson v. Dickson, 36 La. Ann. 453 (1884).
67. See Heirs of Murphy v. Jurey & Gillis, 39 La. Ann. 785 (1887); Glasscock v. Clark, 33 La. Ann. 584 (1881); Bennett v. Fuller, 29 La. Ann. 663
(1877); German v. Gay, 9 La. 580 (1836); Broussard v. Bernard, 7 La. 216
(1834).
68. See note 51 supra.
69. 43 La. Ann. 234 (1891).
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holdings of the Broussard line against the husband who had sold
community property to pay a community debt. The court held
that the wife's heirs could attack a private sale by the husband
in his own interest because made without authority, but they
could not object to a sale of community property to pay a community debt. A careful reading of German v. Gay, a case closely
following Broussard, will likewise make clear that the court
there was not holding that the husband could not settle and
liquidate the community, but only that he could not extend
those powers to include a private sale unrelated to paying
community debts. 70 But this accommodation of the jurisprudence inter sese only begs the real question of whether the wife
or her heirs may be compelled to submit to an administration
of the community before partition. As has been discussed, there
is no legislative basis for the authority of the husband or his
administrator to settle the dissolved community over the wife's
objection. If he does so where there is no objection it is only
as a mandatary or as a negotiorum gestor, and his power as
such can continue only so long as the wife or her heirs do not
demand a partition.
The jurisprudence has often held that the wife or her heirs
may sue for a partition even before the community has been
liquidated and without alleging that it is solvent. 71 The decisions have tried to reconcile this proposition with their holding
that the community is continued fictitiously to pay community
debts. 72 Some decisions have held that if there are no debts,
70. German v. Gay, 9 La. 580, 584 (1836): "The pretensions of the surviving husband . . . rest upon the supposition, that he has in law a right to
settle and liquidate the community, and that the rights of the wife depend
upon such settlement and liquidation. If from this he infers that he can

sell any of the property, composing the mass of gains of the community, we
know not on what law he bases such a pretension. His authority as head
of the community ceases on the dissolution of the marriage." See also Levy
v. Robson, 112 La. 398, 36 So. 472 (1904), in which after the death of the wife,

the husband mortgaged some of the community property. The heirs sued for
their half interest and the court said that since the mortgage was not for
a community debt, the husband had not the right to deal with their interests.
71. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 190 La. 370, 182 So. 541 (1938); Tomme v. Tomme,
174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Butler v. Bolinger, 16 La. App. 397, 133 So.
778 (2d Cir. 1931); Giglio v. Giglio, 159 La. 46, 105 So. 95 (1925); Ogden v.
Leland University, 49 La. Ann. 190, 21 So. 685 (1896); Heirs of Murphy v.

Jurey & Gillis, 39 La. Ann. 785 (1887); Glasscock v. Clark, 33 La. Ann. 584
(1881); Tugwell v. Tugwell, 32 La. Ann. 848 (1880).
72. See Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411, 7 So. 624 (1890), in which
was first coined the phrase that the community was "fictitiously continued"
for the payment of the community debts. See also Guillory v. Latour, 138
La. 142, 70 So. 66 (1915).
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then the community does not maintain a fictitious existence"
and the wife or her heirs will be entitled to an immediate partition. If there are community debts, it would then be held that
the community creditors may proceed against the intact community only if they do so before the wife or her heirs sue for
partition. 74 Once the community has been partitioned, the community creditors must look to the respective parties for their
respective shares. If the community creditors do not demand
an administration of the community, the husband or his administrator is without right to champion the creditors' rights; and
he cannot defeat the claim of the wife or her heirs for a partition.75 This holding must be considered as inconsistent with the
legislation to the extent that it allows the community creditors,
if they act soon enough, to deny the wife or her heirs a partition
by simply demanding an administration of the community.7"
However, there is authority in the jurisprudence which
correctly recognizes the wife's right to an immediate partition,
apparently notwithstanding the demands of the community
73. Tomme v. Tomme, 174 La. 123, 139 So. 901 (1932); Succession of
Hooke, 46 La. Ann. 353, 15 So. 150 (1894); Factors & Trades Ins. Co. v. Levi,
42 La. Ann. 432, 7 So. 625 (1890); Succession of Dumestre, 42 La. Ann. 411,
7 So. 624 (1890); Broussard v. Ditch, 30 La. Ann. 1109 (1878). See especially
Roux v. Jersey Ins. Co., 98 So.2d 906, 909 n.3 (Orl. App. 1957), at which the
court explains that if there are no debts, then the community does not
maintain a fictitious existence. Of course, what is involved here is only the
use of the wife's half interest to pay a community debt; her interest could
not be used to pay a separate debt of the husband. Such a disposition is
considered as the sale of the thing of another and is an absolute nullity. See
Sicard v. Schwab, 112 La. 475, 36 So. 500 (1904); Callahan v. Authement, 99
So.2d 531 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1957).
74. See Heirs of Murphy v. Jurey & Gillis, 39 La. Ann. 785, 787 (1887).
The heirs of the wife were suing for partition, and the husband opposed it.
In finding for the heirs, the court used the following language: "[I]t is
enough . . . that the creditors of the community are not before us seeking
to enforce their claims against the community. Nor would any such inquiry
be permissible in an action of this kind, which is petitory in its character
and the right of the plaintiffs acquired at the instant of the death of the
person from whom they inherited. The community creditors, if there are
any, might have subjected this property by proper proceeding to the payment of their debts and thus divested the plaintiffs of their title to the property, but it has not been done and cannot be done in this form of action,
nor by the parties to the present controversy."
75. Rhodes v. Rhodes, 190 La. 370, 182 So. 541 (1938); Giglio v. Giglio,
159 La. 46, 105 So. 95 (1925).
76. But see note 49 supra, which points out that the community creditors
may be able to seize the undivided interests of both spouses in the former
community before a partition has been effected and to execute upon them.
It is only in this respect that the legislation would allow the community
creditors to defeat the wife's demand for a partition in kind, and this results
from the normal remedies available for creditors to enforce their claims
and not from any matrimonial regime law regarding the settlement of the
community.
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creditors. These decisions have stated that the wife or her
heirs may only succeed in a suit for partition on the theory
that all community debts have been paid or that the suit constitutes an acceptance of the community assets and therefore
an assumption of personal responsibility for their share of community debts.7 This recognizes the wife's right to half the assets
if she will accept half the community debts. In Demoruelle v.
Allen, s it was held that when the community is dissolved, the
spouses are entitled not to one half the net value of the community assets and liabilities, but to a one half interest in the
assets themselves, which may be partitioned before the community is liquidated; and if the wife or her heirs receive specific
assets by partition, they take it subject to one half the com50
munity debts. Daigre v. Daigre7 9 and Pennison v. Pennison
have followed Demoruelle in holding that the wife or her heirs
have an absolute right to one half the assets themselves, but
they have pointed out that neither the wife nor her heirs is
entitled to a judgment for one half the value of the community
before it has been liquidated. This, too, accords with the legislation, which only goes so far as to grant the wife an absolute
right to one half the assets themselves. When the wife asks
for value, she should be considered as implicitly directing the
husband or his administrator to pay the community debts and
to distribute whatever value remains. There has been some
further indication that if the wife or her heirs furnish money
to pay her or their share of community debts, then her or their
share of community assets should not have to be sold.8 1 A
77. Landreaux

v. Louque, 43 La. Ann. 234

(1891).

The

court in

this

case pointed out that partition before liquidation was allowed in Tugwell
and in Glasscock because it was averred in the petition that there no
community debts. See also Washington v. Palmer, 213 La. 79, 34 So.2d 382
(1948), in which it was acknowledged that in the cases cited which allowed
partition before liquidation, there were no community creditors involved.
78. 218 La. 603, 50 So.2d 208 (1950). Here the court granted the wife
a partition, which the husband opposed because (1) he alleged that It was
in derogation of the rights of the mortgage creditor and (2) he claimed
that no partition could be effected until the community debts were paid.
79. 230 La. 472, 89 So.2d 41 (1956).
80. 249 La. 587, 187 So.2d 747 (1966).
81. See Messick v. Mayer, 52 La. Ann. 1161, 27 So. 815 (1900), In which
the court indicated that the widow is in the same position as an heir to
a succession. Unless the heir furnishes the executor or administrator with
money to pay the succession debts, then the succession property may be
sold to pay succession debts. Following this reasoning the widow should
be able to offer to pay her share of the community debts and be entitled
to one-half of the common assets, which could be determined by a
partition.
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partition should also be possible without liquidating the community if there is an extra-judicial settlement of the community
debts.

82

With the development of the fictitiously continued community, the decisions have consistently held that community
creditors enjoy a priority on proceeds from the sale of community assets, with the separate creditors of the spouses being
subordinate to them.8 3 As has been pointed out, there is no
legislative authority, either historical or contemporary, for such
a theory. The question might arise, however, whether or not
a custom has developed whereby the husband or his administrator settles the community and pays community creditors
with priority. Such a custom would not be inconsistent with
the legislation if restricted to the case in which the wife or her
heirs offer no objection and where the community is solvent.
But the writer submits that there can be no legitimate custom
operating to deprive either the wife or her heirs of their absolute
right to an immediate partition, or to create an actual privilege
where the legislation has allowed none.
The 1960 Legislation
The preceding discussion of the Louisiana legislation pertinent to the dissolution of the community of acquets and gains
and the decisions construing it must be reappraised in light of
the Code of Civil Procedure articles involving intestate8 4 and
testate 8 successions and judgments of possession." Article 3001,
which is the principal article in this legislation, provides in
part:
"The surviving spouse in community of an intestate shall
be recognized by the court on an ex parte petition as
entitled to the possession of an undivided half of the community, and of the other undivided half to the extent that
he has the usufruct thereof, without an administration of
82. Bordelon v. Bordelon, 177 So.2d 137 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1965); Saunier
v. Saunier, 217 La. 607, 47 So.2d 19 (1950); Mayer v. Hill, 161 So. 208 (Or.
App. 1935); Succession of Francez, 49 La. Ann. 1732, 23 So. 254 (1897).
83. Scovel v. Levy's Heirs, 118 La. 982, 43 So. 642 (1907); Thompson v.
Vance, 11O La. 26, 34 So. 112 (1903); Zeigler v. His Creditors, 49 La. Ann.
144, 21 So. 666 (1896); Newman v. Cooper, 46 La. Ann. 1485, 16 So. 481
(1894); Webre v. Lorio, 42 La. Ann. 178, 7 So. 460 (1890).
84. LA. COD: CIv. P. arts. 3001-3008.
85. Id. arts. 3031-3035.
86. Id. arts. 3061-3062.
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the succession, when the community is accepted, and the
succession is relatively free of debt, as provided above.""1
This article might be interpreted to indicate that if the deceased's
succession is not relatively free from debt, then the succession
creditors may demand an administration of the succession and
require the survivor in community to submit to an administration of the community in the course thereof before being entitled
to take possession of his or her half-interest as owner and the
other half-interest as usufructuary. This construction, while
not in accord with prior legislation, might certainly be considered to have codified the jurisprudence which holds that,
when the husband dies, the former community is to be administered as part of his succession if the community creditors so
demand. It implies that the husband's succession creditors may
demand an administration and, since the deceased husband is
liable personally for all community debts, the community creditors are his succession creditors and may demand that the community be administered with the succession.
This article, however, makes no distinction between the
deceased husband and the deceased wife, and the construction
in question must be held to allow the deceased wife's succession
creditors to demand that the community be administered with
the wife's succession. This would overrule all jurisprudence
governing dissolution of the community by death of the wife,
which has stated that the wife's administrator has no power
to administer the dissolved community."8 If the wife's heirs
accept the community, then the deceased wife's succession
becomes liable for one half the community debts, and the former
community creditors become succession creditors to the extent
of one half their claims against the former community.
It is submitted that the above-mentioned construction is
not the proper one, as it confuses a matrimonial regime right
with a succession right. Under matrimonial regime law, the
87. Id. art. 3001 sets out the basic rule on putting the surviving spouse
into possession of the community property. In the case of testate successions, article 3031 provides that the surviving spouse in community of the
testator may be recognized by the court as entitled to the possession of
the community property, as provided in article 3001. Article 3061, in
implementing article 3001, states that the judgment of possession shall
recognize the surviving spouse in community as entitled to the possession
of an undivided half of the community property, and of the other undivided half to the extent that he has the usufruct thereof.
88. See note 63 supra.
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survivor in community is entitled to an immediate partition
of his or her undivided half-interest in the former community,
regardless of the solvency or insolvency of either the community or the deceased's succession. In the case of the wife, all
that is required is that she accept the community and assume
personal liability for one half the community debts.8 9 Only the
deceased's half interest in the former community forms part
of his succession. To allow, on motion of the decedent's succession creditors, who may not even be community creditors,
an administration of the survivor's half-interest in the community with the deceased's succession, as article 3001 appears
to do, and to condition the survivors's right to possession on
the relative absence of succession debts, which may not even
be community debts, is to ignore the basic principles of our
matrimonial regime law. The writer suggests that the proper
construction of article 3001 is that it recognizes that, in the
event of an intestate succession, the survivor in community is
entitled (1) to an undivided half of the community when the
community is accepted (the survivor takes this half by right)
and (2) to the other undivided half (as to which the usufruct of
the surviving spouse under Civil Code article 916 applies) 9
without an administration of the succession when the succession is relatively free from debt. This construction would correctly isolate the survivor's right to half the former community,
a matrimonial regime right which does not depend on succession debts, from the other undivided half, which involves a
succession right and which does form part of the deceased's
succession. If there are substantial succession debts, the succession may be administered, but the survivor's half-interest
does not form a part of the deceased's succession.
89. Pascal, The Work of the Lousi'ana AppeZate Courts for the 1968-1969

Term-Matrimonial Regimes, 30 LA. L. REv. 219, 223 (1970).
90. LA. Civ. CODE art. 916: "In all cases, when the predeceased husband
or wife shall have left Issue of the marriage with the survivor, and shall
not have not disposed by last will and testament, of his or her share in

the community property, the survivor shall hold in usufruct, during his
or her natural life, so much of the share of the deceased in such community property as may be inherited by such issue. This usufruct shall

cease, however, whenever the survivor shall enter into a second marriage."
Article 916 is found in bk. III, tit. I (Of Successions), ch. III (Of Irregular
Successions), and It does not limit the survivor's usufruct to instances in
which the community is accepted by the wife. The only criterion is Inheri-

tance of community assets by children of the marriage. The article, by its
own terms, Is a succession right and is independent of any matrimonial
regime rights.
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This construction is supported by Code of Civil Procedure
article 3007, which provides that succession creditors may demand security when an intestate's heirs, or the heirs and the
surviving spouse, have been sent into possession of the property
of the intestate, which includes only half of the former community over which the survivor has a usufruct. Code of Civil
Procedure article 3008 provides that when security pursuant to
article 3007 is not given, the court, on an ex parte motion of the
creditors, may order an administration of the succession, and
the parties sent into possession must surrender to the administrator all of the property of the deceased, which they have
received, which in the case of the survivor will only be the
deceased's half interest over which he has a usufruct. It is
submitted that these articles are not authority for allowing any
administration of the survivor's half-interest in the former
community; nor do they require the survivor to give security
for his share. This construction gives the fullest effect to all
of these articles; and it is consistent with Civil Code articles
584 and 585, which indicate that where the usufructuary does
not advance the amount necessary to discharge debts of the
property subject to his usufruct, then so much of the property
as is necessary to pay the debts may be sold.0 1 Likewise, under
articles 3007 and 3008, if the usufructuary does not furnish
security, the property burdened with the usufruct may be
administered with the succession of the deceased.
Since Code of Civil Procedure articles 3001-3008, 3031-3035,
and 3061-3062 only involve possession of undivided interests,
it is suggested that they should not be construed to defeat the
right of the wife or her heirs to sue for a partition. Once the
community has been accepted, the right to a partition is
absolute.
Joseph E. LeBlanc, Jr.

DUTY OF INSURER TO SETTLE
In a society of increasing complexity, insurance has assumed
a role of significant utility. The contract of insurance has
become sophisticated and inclusive in its provisions; thus, interpretation of the contract and determination of its legal con91. See Succession of Bringier, 4 La. Ann. 389 (1849);
Fitzwilliams, 3 La. Ann. 489 (1848).

Succession of

